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spontaneous miscarriages within the past two years and is now seeking treatment
at a local fertility clinic. Preliminary tests show that the patient’s most recent
abortus (i.e., an aborted fetus less than twelve weeks old) contains several
chromosomal abnormalities (also known as “aneuploidies”), and the physician
determines that preimplantation genetic screening (PGS)1 may be warranted to
help counter the patient’s history of recurrent pregnancy loss. The fertility clinic is
familiar with traditional aneuploidy screening techniques, which involve biopsying
one to two cells from cleavage-stage embryos and conducting fluorescent in situ
hybridization (FISH) analysis—a procedure that was developed over ten years ago
and is frequently practiced by a majority of fertility clinics that assist in the
identification and transfer of viable embryos.2 The physician, through her own
independent research, learns of a fairly new PGS-aneuploidy screening technique
that (a) is less likely to damage the patient’s embryos (which are, without question,
invaluable to individuals struggling with infertility) during the biopsy step, and (b)
yields more complete, accurate, and reliable genetic information than FISH
analysis. However, PGS-aneuploidy screening is still regarded as an experimental
technique within the medical community.3 Additionally, the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine’s (ASRM)4 existing clinical practice guidelines (CPGs)
recommend against the routine application of PGS-aneuploidy screening in
patients diagnosed with repetitive pregnancy loss.5 Moreover, the ASRM’s CPGs
fail to recommend preferred PGS-aneuploidy screening protocols that would
signal the standard of care that is expected of a physician performing these
procedures.6
The physician is now confronted with a difficult choice—should she
minimize her risk of liability by recommending the traditional aneuploidy
screening technique that has been available for the past decade and appears to be a
customary practice within the field? Or should she recommend the newer,
optimized technique that is arguably more beneficial in terms of clinical outcome,
but is not yet a generally accepted practice? Legal ambiguity as to what the proper
standard of care is under these circumstances creates uncertainty about the risk of
malpractice liability for adopting emerging technologies that are not yet generally
1. PGS is a technique that seeks to improve the outcomes of assisted reproductive treatments
by ensuring that the embryos selected for transfer are chromosomally normal.
2. Elpida Fragouli & Dagan Wells, Aneuploidy Screening for Embryo Selection, 30 S EMINARS
REPROD. MED. 289, 290 (2012).
3. Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. & Practice Comm. of the Am.
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preimplantation Genetic Testing: A Practice Committee Opinion, 90 FERTILITY &
STERILITY S136, S141–42 (2008) [hereinafter SART & ASRM].
4. The ASRM is a professional medical society that oversees developments in the field of
reproductive medicine. About Us: Vision of ASRM, ASRM, http://www.asrm.org/about/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2014).
5. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Evaluation and Treatment of Recurrent
Pregnancy Loss: A Committee Opinion, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1103, 1105 (2012) [hereinafter
ASRM].
6. See id.; SART & ASRM, supra note 3.
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accepted by the medical community. Such uncertainty may effectively deter
physicians from adopting new medical techniques and devices, even if the
technologies offer broad social benefits in the form of superior clinical outcomes.
An unfortunate side effect of this reluctance is that patients with poor medical
prognoses are more likely to receive suboptimal PGS-aneuploidy screening
services because physicians either fail to recommend or to provide the improved
technology.
One possible solution is to impose a legal duty on assisted reproductive
technology (ART) specialists to offer and provide optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening services as part of the standard of care for patients that have an elevated
risk of miscarriage or low implantation rates. However, despite the vast literature
on the legal, social, and ethical ramifications of preimplantation genetic diagnostic
(PGD) testing,7 there is barely any scholarship that directly addresses the standard
of care that ART physicians owe to their patients in the context of adopting
emerging technologies. This Note attempts to resolve this apparent gap by
defining a standard of care that is dynamic, easy to administrate, and circumvents
the problems of over- and underinclusiveness, thereby ensuring that similarly
situated defendants will be treated equally under the law. Ease of application
reduces the burden on courts, juries, and litigants by facilitating the resolution of
malpractice claims. Dynamism, or flexibility, guarantees that the law adapts to
“changes and improvement in medical science.”8 Circumventing the problems of
over- and underinclusiveness involves tailoring the law as closely as possible,
neither to hold too many nor too few defendants accountable for their conduct.
Part I evaluates the clinical benefits of integrating optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening with routine in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures, especially in patients
with an elevated risk of implantation failure or recurrent pregnancy loss. Part II
explores current legal doctrines that define a physician’s standard of care in the
context of adopting novel medical technologies. Part III of this Note argues that
courts should apply the “reasonable physician” standard rather than a custombased, or CPG-based, standard of care with respect to emerging ART
technologies if the end goal is to remain fair and realistic as the practice of
reproductive medicine continues to evolve. Ultimately, this Note argues that
imposing a duty on ART physicians to provide optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening services as part of the standard of care is both tenable and opportune in

7. See, e.g., COLIN GAVAGHAN, DEFENDING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET: LAW AND
ETHICS OF SELECTING THE NEXT GENERATION (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2007);
REPROGENETICS: LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES (Lori P. Knowles & Gregory E. Kaebnick
eds., 2007); ROSAMUND SCOTT, CHOOSING BETWEEN POSSIBLE LIVES: LAW AND E THICS OF
PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (2007); THE SORTING SOCIETY (Loane
Skene & Janna Thompson eds., 2008); Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting
Gender, Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241 (2005).
8. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001).

1298

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1295

light of recent advances in comprehensive molecular cytogenetics and embryo
biopsy procedures.
I. ASSESSING THE CLINICAL BENEFITS OF
OPTIMIZED PGS-ANEUPLOIDY SCREENING TECHNIQUES
One of the major challenges ART physicians currently face is how to reduce
the risk of multiple pregnancy while improving overall pregnancy rates. As the
ART field attempts to move toward single embryo transfer, developing reliable
methods that accurately predict which embryos are likely to produce a healthy
child becomes increasingly important. Chromosomal abnormality, or aneuploidy,
negatively impacts embryo viability and is one of the major causes of recurrent
miscarriages9 and failed IVF attempts.10 One proposal to improve implantation
and pregnancy rates after IVF involves the identification and preferential transfer
of chromosomally normal (euploid) embryos since the transfer of a
chromosomally abnormal embryo is unlikely to result in a healthy live birth.11 For
the past decade, a growing number of fertility clinics have adopted chromosome
screening techniques to assist in the identification and transfer of viable
embryos.12 The most common approach involves the biopsy of one or two cells
from embryos at the cleavage stage (three days after fertilization), followed by
chromosomal analysis via FISH and the preferential transfer of euploid embryos.13
This approach is commonly referred to as PGS, and has mostly been targeted at
patients with poor medical prognoses, such as recurrent pregnancy loss, repeated
implantation failure, or advanced maternal age.14 Although several pioneering
groups have reported improvements in IVF outcomes after PGS,15 a number of

9. M.D. Stephenson et al., Cytogenetic Analysis of Miscarriages from Couples with Recurrent Miscarriage:
A Case-Control Study, 17 HUM. REPROD. 446, 446–51 (2002).
10. Y. Verlinsky et al., Pregnancies Following Pre-Conception Diagnosis of Common Aneuploidies by
Fluorescent In-Situ Hybridization, 10 HUM. REPROD. 1923, 1923–27 (1995).
11. Santiago Munné, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Human Implantation—A Review, 24
PLACENTA S70, S70–S76 (2003).
12. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 290.
13. Id. (“[T]he vast majority of PGS cases have continued to be conducted on day 3. The
reasons for the continued application of chromosome screening at the cleavage stage may be due to
most embryologists having little experience with embryo biopsy at other stages, limiting exploration
of alternatives, and due to publications providing reassurance that . . . the proportion of embryos
misdiagnosed is low.”).
14. Santiago Munné et al., Diagnosis of Major Chromosome Aneuploidies in Human Preimplantation
Embryos, 8 HUM. REPROD. 2185, 2185–91 (1993).
15. See John G. Garrisi et al., Effect of Infertility, Maternal Age and Number of Previous Miscarriages on
the Outcome of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Idiopathic Recurrent Pregnancy Loss, 92 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 288, 288–95 (2009); Luca Gianaroli et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Increases the
Implantation Rate in Human In Vitro Fertilization by Avoiding the Transfer of Chromosomally Abnormal
Embryos, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1128, 1128–31 (1997); Santiago Munné et al., Improved
Implantation After Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis of Aneuploidy, 7 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 91,
91–97 (2003); Santiago Munné et al., Positive Outcome After Preimplantation Diagnosis of Aneuploidy in
Human Embryos, 14 HUM. REPROD. 2191, 2191–99 (1999); Santiago Munné et al., Preimplantation
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studies have failed to demonstrate improvements in IVF outcomes for patients of
advanced maternal age, thus causing researchers to question the clinical efficacy of
PGS screening.16 In fact, a seminal study revealed that the ongoing pregnancy rate
and live birth rate were significantly lower in women who underwent PGS
screening compared to their untreated counterparts.17
There are several biological and technical explanations for why PGS via
FISH failed to improve implantation and pregnancy rates. First, PGS is based on
the faulty assumptions that the single cell biopsied is representative of the rest of
the embryo given, and that approximately twenty to forty percent of human
cleavage-stage embryos are mosaic.18 Embryonic mosaicism thus poses significant
accuracy problems for diagnostics based on the sampling of a single cell. Second,
PGS specialists cannot improve testing accuracy by running duplicate experiments
because the biopsied cell only provides enough genetic material to conduct one to
two genetic tests, at most.19 Third, the removal of even a single cell from a
cleavage-stage embryo may lead to reduced viability and implantation rates.20 This
reduction in implantation rate is likely to be much higher if experienced
practitioners do not perform the biopsy procedure, which could potentially
eliminate any benefit obtained by embryo screening.21 Fourth, the overall
Genetic Diagnosis Significantly Reduces Pregnancy Loss in Infertile Couples: A Multicenter Study, 85 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 326, 326–32 (2006).
16. See T. Hardarson et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening in Women of Advanced Maternal Age
Caused a Decrease in Clinical Pregnancy Rate: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 23 HUM. REPROD. 2806, 2806–
12 (2008); Sebastiaan Mastenbroek et al., In Vitro Fertilization with Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 357
NEW ENG. J. M ED. 9, 9–17 (2007); Catherine Staessen et al., Comparison of Blastocyst Transfer with or
Without Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Aneuploidy Screening in Couples with Advanced Maternal Age: A
Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial, 19 HUM. REPROD. 2849, 2849–58 (2004).
17. Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 9; see also Hardarson et al., supra note 16, at 2806.
18. Evelyne Vanneste et al., Chromosome Instability Is Common in Human Cleavage-Stage Embryos,
15 NATURE MED. 577, 577–83 (2009); Lucille Voullaire et al., Chromosome Analysis of Blastomeres from
Human Embryos by Using Comparative Genomic Hybridization, 106 HUM. GENETICS 210, 210–17 (2000).
Mosaicism refers to a condition where not every cell in the embryo has the same chromosome
structure.
19.
Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 297–98 (2008) (“Having only the biopsied cell’s DNA
available for testing greatly limits testing options . . . . Currently, couples must choose between
conducting an analysis on five to nine chromosomes and conducting one to two genetic tests, as these
tests examine the DNA in different ways.”).
20. Jacques Cohen et al., Removal of 2 Cells from Cleavage Stage Embryos Is Likely to Reduce the
Efficacy of Chromosomal Tests That Are Used to Enhance Implantation Rates, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY
496, 496–503 (2007); A. De Vos et al., Impact of Cleavage-Stage Embryo Biopsy in View of PGD on Human
Blastocyst Implantation: A Prospective Cohort of Single Embryo Transfers, 24 HUM. REPROD. 2988, 2988–96
(2009).
21. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 291; William B. Schoolcraft et al., Clinical Application of
Comprehensive Chromosomal Screening at the Blastocyst Stage, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1700, 1704
(2010). Excessive biopsy damage appears to have been a contributing factor in at least one PGS study
that found no benefit of chromosome screening. Jacques Cohen & James A. Grifo, Multicentre Trial of
Preimplantation Genetic Screening Reported in the New England Journal of Medicine: An In-Depth Look at the
Findings, 15 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 365, 365–66 (2007); Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Pioneers from the USA and Europe Refute New England Journal of Medicine Article, MED. NEWS TODAY
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effectiveness of single-cell FISH analysis is hampered by several technical
limitations. Single-cell FISH involves technically challenging steps, like cell fixation
on a microscope slide that is sensitive to changes in temperature and humidity,
and if performed incorrectly, can yield inconclusive results.22 Furthermore, more
than one-half of the chromosomes in each biopsied cell remain unexamined after
FISH analysis,23 enabling some chromosomally abnormal embryos to be classified
as “normal,” and thus erroneously selected for transfer.24
Fortunately, advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening have led to the creation
of techniques that overcome most of the problems that limit FISH-based PGS
methods. The first improvement involves performing the embryo-biopsy
procedure at the blastocyst stage, two days later than traditional PGS methods.25
Unlike individual cells in cleavage-stage embryos, trophectoderm cells sampled
during blastocyst biopsy have much lower rates of mosaicism, and are thus highly
representative of the remainder of the embryo.26 Although it is typical to extract
about five cells, the relative proportion of the embryo volume that is removed
during the blastocyst stage is smaller than that associated with single-cell biopsy at
the cleavage stage.27 Moreover trophectoderm cells are destined to form the
placenta rather than the actual fetus.28 Thus, unlike cleavage-stage embryo biopsy,
trophectoderm sampling is less likely to be detrimental to embryo viability, a
notion that is supported by high survival and implantation rates.29 Emerging data
also reveals that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies, like
comparative genomic hybridization (CGH), SNP microarrays, and qPCR-based
comprehensive chromosome screening (CCS) technology, could offer clinical
benefits to certain women at high risk for an aneuploid pregnancy.30 Furthermore,
( July 10, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/76269.php [hereinafter PGD
Pioneers].
22. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 291.
23. Id. at 290 (“This was due to the fact that only five distinct colors (fluorochromes) in the
visible spectrum were available for probe labeling, and consequently the number of chromosomes
that could be simultaneously assessed was limited . . . .”).
24. King, supra note 19, at 293 n.37. Even the best FISH-based methods fail to detect about
twenty percent of abnormal embryos, not to mention other FISH-based methods where more than
one-half of the abnormal embryos may go undetected. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1704.
25. Single Euploid Blastocyst Transfer Recent Technology, FERTILITY CTR. & APPLIED GENETICS
FLA., http://geneticsandfertility.com/blastocyst-transfer-recent-technology/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2014).
26. E. Fragouli et al., Comprehensive Molecular Cytogenetic Analysis of the Human Blastocyst Stage, 23
HUM. REPROD. 2596, 2596–608 (2008).
27. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 296.
28. Id.
29. Steven J. McArthur et al., Pregnancies and Live Births After Trophectoderm Biopsy and
Preimplantation Genetic Testing of Human Blastocysts, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1628, 1628–36 (2005);
Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1704.
30. E.J. Forman et al., Single Embryo Transfer with Comprehensive Chromosome Screening Results in
Improved Ongoing Pregnancy Rates and Decreased Miscarriage Rates, 27 HUM. REPROD. 1217, 1217–22 (2012)
(evaluating the efficacy of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS in an infertile population);
Ali Hellani et al., Successful Pregnancies After Application of Array-Comparative Genomic Hybridization in PGSAneuploidy Screening, 17 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 841, 843 (2008) (showing successful clinical
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several recent studies show that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic
methodologies also improve the success rate of single-embryo transfers in good
prognosis IVF patients, thereby reducing the risk of a multiple pregnancy.31 Taken
together, these data strongly suggest that PGS screening can improve IVF
outcomes in patients, regardless of age or medical prognosis.
PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques involving CGH, SNP, or CCS are
diagnostically superior because, unlike FISH-based methods, they can gather
information on the entire chromosome complement of individual cells, thereby
minimizing the likelihood of selecting chromosomally abnormal embryos for
transfer.32 These screening methods are less difficult compared to FISH because
they do not require cell fixation on a microscope slide,33 and the two to five cells
removed during trophectoderm biopsy provide more than enough starting genetic
material to analyze all twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.34 Perhaps the most
important advantage that these comprehensive molecular cytogenetic approaches
have over FISH is that they are far less susceptible to errors caused by mosaicism
than FISH, and thus, they maximize the likelihood of identifying euploid embryos
for preferential transfer.35

application of CGH-based screening in advanced maternal age patients with recurrent IVF failures);
Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1705; William B. Schoolcraft et al., Comprehensive Chromosome
Screening (CSS) with Vitrification Results in Improved Clinical Outcome in Women >35 Years: A Randomized
Control Trial, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S1 (2012) (finding that interrogating embryos by arrayCGH resulted in significantly higher pregnancy rates compared to non-PGS-treated controls); William
B. Schoolcraft et al., Live Birth Outcome with Trophectoderm Biopsy, Blastocyst Vitrification, and SingleNucleotide Polymorphism Microarray-Based Comprehensive Chromosome Screening in Infertile Patients, 96
FERTILITY & STERILITY 638, 639 (2011) (finding that the combination of trophectoderm biopsy,
blastocyst vitrification, and SNP microarrays for CCS results in high implantation and live birth rates
in infertile patients); R.T. Scott, Jr. et al., A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial Demonstrating
Significantly Increased Clinical Pregnancy Rates Following 24 Chromosome Aneuploidy Screening: Biopsy and
Analysis on Day 5 with Fresh Transfer, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY S2, S2 (2010) (evaluating the efficacy
of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS in IVF patients less than forty-three years of age
with no history of failed cycles).
31. E.J. Forman et al., Blastocyst Euploid Selective Transfer (BEST): An RCT of Comprehensive
Chromosome Screening–Single Embryo Transfer (CCS-SET) vs Double Embryo Transfer (DET)—Equivalent
Pregnancy Rates, Eliminates Twins, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY S49, S49 (2012) (evaluating the efficacy
of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS compared to the current standard of care, a double
unscreened embryo transfer); Zhihong Yang et al., Selection of Single Blastocysts for Fresh Transfer via
Standard Morphology Assessment Alone and with Array CGH for Good Prognosis IVF Patients: Results from a
Randomized Pilot Study, 5 MOLECULAR CYTOGENETICS 24, 24 (2012) (evaluating the efficacy of single
embryo transfer with CGH in good prognosis IVF patients).
32. See studies cited supra notes 29–31.
33. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1705.
34. Paul R. Brezina et al., Single-Gene Testing Combined with Single Nucleotide Polymorphism
Microarray Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Aneuploidy: A Novel Approach in Optimizing Pregnancy
Outcome, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1786.e5, 1786.e6 (2011).
35. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 297.
Specifically, methods such as aCGH or SNP microarrays provide an average view of the
biopsied TE sample, and aneuploidy is generally not detected unless it is present in more
than a third of the cells sampled. It could be argued that the failure to detect low levels of
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In sum, studies combining optimized biopsy procedures and comprehensive
molecular cytogenetic screening methods have, thus far, yielded extremely
promising IVF outcomes, and “may finally allow preimplantation genetic
screening to achieve the benefits predicted by theory.”36 Advances in PGSaneuploidy screening represent a major milestone in the medical community’s
movement toward single embryo transfer, and have the potential to transform
routine medical procedures in fertility clinics throughout the globe.
II. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DOCTRINES GOVERNING
A PHYSICIAN’S STANDARD OF CARE FOR
E MERGING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
Early adoption of cutting-edge medical technologies by physicians is
accompanied by some degree of malpractice liability risk. The standard of care for
malpractice liability claims varies between jurisdictions but generally requires an
evaluation of the physician’s conduct against professional custom, or the
“reasonable physician” standard.37 At the same time, medical malpractice and
negligence doctrines make it clear that standards of care are evolutionary rather
than static, and health-care providers have a “duty to stay abreast” of new
techniques and advances.38 But the simple recognition that medical knowledge
evolves over time
provides scarce insight into the reality that those changes do not occur
seamlessly, but by fits and starts, with the serial introduction of a
multitude of new drugs, new devices, and new techniques, each of which
starts out as experimental agent with imperfectly known risks, and each
of which involves a departure from what most physicians are doing, ex
ante, in providing care for their patients.39
Far less clear is how the standard of care analysis applies to a situation where an
injury results from the use of emerging technologies that have not yet been
incorporated into the standard customary practices of most physicians.
Part II is thus concerned with identifying the existing legal frameworks that
define a physician’s standard of care for adopting emerging medical technologies.
Part II.A examines the courts’ movement away from a custom-based standard of
abnormal cells is a disadvantage of these methods applied to blastocyst biopsies. However,
in most cases, low-level mosaicism is probably of little clinical significance.
Id.
36. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1700.
37. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 165–88 (2000); Donald E. Kacmar, Note, The Impact of Computerized
Medical Literature Databases on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Time for Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up
Call?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 647 (1997).
38. See generally Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice
Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 508–12
(2004).
39. Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard of
Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 424–25 (2009).
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care, toward a “reasonable physician” standard of care. Part II.B delves into the
commonly recited yet nebulous duty to stay abreast and its impact on the
appropriate standard of care for medical professionals. Part II.C explains why
CPGs, despite their usefulness, should not be treated as the panacea for
determining the standard of care. Finally, Part II.D analyzes the common law
doctrine of the duty to inform patients of a newly developed, alternative therapy.
Taken together, these concepts and legal frameworks help mitigate a physician’s
reluctance in adopting new technologies due to the ill-defined malpractice liability
risks associated with doing so. A liberal interpretation of the malpractice standard
of care with respect to emerging technologies would promote both physician and
patient autonomy, foster innovation and rapid optimization of new medical
techniques and devices, and reduce costs on patients, thereby contributing to an
elevated standard of professional care.
A. The Demise of Judicial Deference to Custom in Medical Malpractice
The goal of the malpractice standard of care is to ensure that physicians
fulfill their professional obligations with appropriate skill and care. Much like a
negligence claim, to prevail in a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that
duty, and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the defendant’s
breach.40 What separates a medical malpractice claim from an ordinary negligence
claim is the duty owed by the defendant, or the “standard of care.” Physicians
traditionally have only needed to conform to the customs of their peers.41
Consequently, the relevant inquiry under a custom-based standard of care is not
whether the defendant behaved like a reasonable person (or even a reasonable
physician for that matter), but instead whether the defendant’s actions were
consistent with professional norms. Thus, evidence of the ineffectiveness of
customary practices is often excluded under the custom-based standard of care.42
A key concern with maintaining a custom-based standard of care is that the
40. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND K EETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–
65 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
41. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS & OTHER HEALERS § 348 (1981).
Historically, a jury’s determination of the applicable standard of care was limited by the “locality rule,”
which holds the physician to the standard of care exercised by physicians in the defendant’s own
community or locality. See Katherine Randall Bowden, Comment, Standard of Care for Medical
Practitioners—Abandonment of the Locality Rule, 60 KY. L.J. 209, 209–15 (1971); Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and
Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408 (1969). The
locality rule developed as a method for evaluating the applicable standard of care by taking into
account the variety of resource conditions that existed within different communities. E. Haavi
Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1719, 1729 (1987).
However, the rationale for the locality rule has continued to erode over the past several decades as a
result of advances in technology, standardized curricula in medical schools, required physician
certification, and increased access to technology and resources. Id. at 1730.
42. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he issue in medical
malpractice is not whether a particular treatment is effective but whether that treatment is a deviation
from accepted medical practice in the community.”).
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standard “may create perverse incentives that have little to do with preventing or
compensating medical injuries, and far more to do with physicians’ perceptions
about the potential risks to themselves associated with medical innovation.”43 To
understand the potential for perverse incentives, one must evaluate the costs and
benefits associated with new technology, and how new technology adoption
operates generally.44 The cost of developing and obtaining new medical
technology is often astronomical. Such costs are necessarily balanced or
outweighed by a set of clinical benefits if the technology is to remain marketable.
For instance, the new technology may confer therapeutic benefits that are
otherwise unavailable, or function as a risk-superior alternative to existing
treatments. Thus, a new technology that is more effective compared to the status
quo might result in a range of long-term social welfare benefits, including reduced
mortality risks, improved patient outcomes, and lower health-care utilization and
costs.45
But the danger posed by a custom-based standard of care is that it escalates
the risks and costs associated with adopting new technology, apart from any
underlying clinical risks associated with the technology itself.46 Consequently,
physicians’ perceptions about elevated malpractice risks would effectively deter
them from considering new technologies that could otherwise be cost-effective
and risk-reducing.47 But creating disincentives to innovation certainly cannot be
the intended purpose of the malpractice doctrine. Rather, the aim of establishing a
standard of care is to ensure that providers use appropriate prudence and skill in
delivering medical services, regardless of treatment modality.48 Malpractice law is
thus charged with maintaining an equitable balance between competing
interests—on the one hand, the legal regime should encourage providers to
carefully scrutinize new technology to protect patients against avoidable,
incremental clinical risks, and to apply any new technology with prudence and
skill.49 On the other hand, the law should also promote the adoption of new
technology when it confers broad social benefits that go beyond those that accrue
directly to patients.50 While it is important to have laws that force physicians to
carefully assess the risks and benefits of new technology prior to adopting it, we
do not want to create a regime that effectively prevents the standard of care from
evolving. Consequently, a custom-based standard of care arguably creates
potential disincentives to adopting new medical technology that are neither
intended nor socially desirable.
Fortunately, judicial deference to physician customs has been gradually
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Greenberg, supra note 39, at 440.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id.
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eroding over the past several decades.51 A quarter of the states have expressly
rejected deference to medical customary norms.52 Nine additional states, although
not directly addressing the role of custom, have rephrased the malpractice
standard of care in terms of what a reasonable physician would do, rather than
what is customarily done.53 The “reasonable physician” standard of care is the
same test employed by the states that have expressly rejected a custom-based
standard of care. Instead of focusing on what is customarily done, the reasonable
physician standard concentrates on what is “reasonable to expect of a professional
given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the treatment in issue.”54 The
differences between the reasonable physician standard and the custom-based
standard may be subtle at times because, in most instances, the customary
practices of most physicians correspond closely to an objective standard of
reasonableness based on the current state of the art in medicine.55 But unlike a
custom-based standard, adherence to customary practices does not categorically
immunize a physician from malpractice liability. The reasonable physician standard
also involves examining the expertise of the physician, the health of the patient,
the state of medical knowledge, the risks and benefits of the recommended
treatment, and other patient-specific factors that may have influenced the choice
of treatment.56 Thus, in principle, the objective “reasonable physician” standard
gives courts more latitude in reviewing medical knowledge and customs, and in
deciding what the malpractice standard of care should be in a given situation.
Moreover, jurisdictions that ostensibly endorse custom actually apply the
custom-based standard of care in a way that operates very much like a reasonable
physician standard.57 Courts that theoretically continue to defer to custom have
created several subsidiary doctrines that attempt to set limits on a custom-based
standard of care.58 These doctrines include (a) an iteration of an “acceptable
alternatives” rule, including the “two schools of thought” or “respectable
minority” rule, which establishes that the standard of care in medicine is not
unitary, and that there are myriad situations where several forms of medical
treatment may be consistent with reasonable care;59 (b) the best judgment rule,
51. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 170–85.
52. Id. at 172–79.
53. Id. at 180–85.
54. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001). See generally Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 180–85.
55. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–6 (1992). See generally Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 188–90.
56. J. Brad Kallmyer, Note, A Chimera in Every Sense: Standard of Care for Physicians Practicing
Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2 IND. H EALTH L. REV. 225, 257 (2005).
57. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 185–88.
58. Id. at 170.
59. See, e.g., Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834 (Haw. 1998) (“It is not negligent for a
physician, based on the knowledge that he reasonably possesses at the time, to select a particular
course of treatment among acceptable medical alternatives.”); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87
(Me. 1974) (“[A] physician does not incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several
recognized courses of treatment.” (citation omitted)).
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which requires physicians with unique information to use it regardless of
customary norms;60 and (c) the common knowledge rule, which permits plaintiffs’
verdicts despite evidence that physicians complied with customary standards.61
Another observation worth noting is that courts within these custom-based
jurisdictions frequently fail to enforce the standard of care by not requiring
plaintiffs’ experts to prove that a prevailing custom existed, and that the defendant
deviated from the custom.62 This tendency toward loose application of the
custom-based standard of care may be partially attributable to the significant
obstacles to proving the existence of a prevailing customary norm. First, courts
have retreated from reliance on local customs in favor of a standard based on
similar localities or a national standard.63 But medical customs vary widely from
one geographic community to another,64 and given these variations in physician
practice patterns across the country, the notion of a national custom seems less
than realistic. Second, variability in patient pools, illnesses, and possible
therapeutic responses,65 as well as the economic stratification of patients, act as
barriers to the formation of stable customs.66 Finally, even when a widely favored
practice actually exists, ascertaining that custom at a reasonable cost may be
impossible.67 In the real world of malpractice litigation, expert witnesses base their
opinions on their experience and the readily available medical literature, but
60. E.g., Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968) (finding
negligence notwithstanding a physician’s adherence to customary practice where defendant’s choice
among the available alternatives was unreasonable in light of contrary data); Burton v. Brooklyn
Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982) (same).
61. See, e.g., Ault v. Hall, 164 N.E. 518, 522–23 (Ohio 1928) (permitting the sponge count
issue to reach the jury despite evidence that the physician complied with custom); 1 BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 368 (1995) (describing common knowledge exception).
62. E.g., McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338, 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting plaintiff to
reach the jury with testimony that the defendant’s conduct was not “reasonable”); Sanders v. Ramo,
416 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (accepting plaintiff’s expert testimony that merely stated that
the defendant “departed from reasonable standards of surgical care”); Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d
729, 733 (Mo. 1992) (accepting testimony about defendant’s “failure to exercise that degree of skill
and learning that an ordinarily careful and prudent physician would have exercised”).
63. E.g., Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1952); Tallbull v. Whitney, 564 P.2d 162
(Mont. 1977), abrogated by Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204 (Mont. 1990); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 121 A.2d
669 (R.I. 1956); see, e.g., WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 343–44 (5th
ed. 1998) (discussing loosening of locality rule); 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 61, § 6-2, at 360 (stating
national standard is majority rule).
64. See Jack E. Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, 7 HEALTH AFF. 99, 99
(1988).
65. See M ARK A. H ALL, M AKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 84–88 (1997)
(commenting on the complex and patient-specific nature of individual treatment decisions); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in
Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1390 (1994) (concluding that “highly
differentiated nature of medical problems” hinders the formation of stable medical customs); Alan H.
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 584 (1959) (explaining that
“there is no standard patient”).
66. See Henderson, Jr. & Siliciano, supra note 65, at 1393–94 (“[E]conomic stratification of the
patient population precludes formation of a stable unitary custom.”).
67. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 187.
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typically do not know the actual percentage of physicians who would act as the
defendant did under the specific circumstances. Thus, one plausible explanation
for the lack of strict enforcement of the custom-based standard of care is that
courts are aware of the obstacles to obtaining proof of deviation from an
established custom.68
Courts are always cognizant of their role in altering tort law to reflect societal
change. Indeed, it is the judicial system’s responsibility “to modernize traditional
principles of tort law when such becomes necessary ‘to ensure that the law
remains both fair and realistic as society and technology change.’”69 Public
deference to the judgment of medical professionals has gradually declined in the
past sixty years.70 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is increased
patient awareness of medical error, which is not unexpected given the pervasive
nature of contemporary media.71 As the general level of education and public
awareness of health issues continue to grow, patients tend to be more
knowledgeable and to seek more autonomy with respect to medical decision
making.72 Courts are also more reluctant to trust physicians to regulate themselves,
and have transitioned away from the belief that physicians are sufficiently different
from engineers, product manufacturers, and other businesses to justify the special
privileges previously accorded to physicians.73 Indeed, the creation of common
law doctrines, including (a) the duty to stay abreast, which obligates physicians to
be aware of evolving practices in medical care and make appropriate use of new
scientific knowledge as it emerges;74 (b) the duty to inform the patient of
appropriate alternative treatments under the informed consent doctrine;75 and (c)
experimental protocol cases that permit patients to consent to noncustomary
68. Id.
69. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984), abrogated by Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 934
(1996)); see also Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 736 (N.M. 1990) (“[Our State] has recognized
that tort law is not static—it must expand to recognize changing circumstances that our evolving
society brings to our attention.”).
70. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 196.
71. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., Patient Safety: Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public
on Medical Errors, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1933 (2002) (noting the fact that surveys indicated that half
of the American public followed media coverage of a recent report by the Institute of Medicine,
entitled To Err Is Human, which concluded that more Americans die as a result of medical errors made
in hospitals than as a result of injuries from automobile accidents); Preventing Medication Errors, INST.
MED. ( July 20, 2006), http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2006/PreventingMedication-Errors-Quality-Chasm-Series/medicationerrorsnew.pdf; To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health System, INST. MED. (Nov. 1, 1999), http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report
%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf.
72. Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician’s Duty to Inform of Newly Developed Therapy, 6 J. CONTEMP.
H EALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 46 (1990).
73. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 192, 199–200.
74. See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982);
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins.
Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001); Williams, supra note 38, at 508–12.
75. Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d 285, 288–89 (Okla. 1984); Keogan v. Holy
Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252–53 (Wash. 1980).
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experimental treatments76 appear to be a judicial response to the public’s declining
trust in health-care providers and represent a further shift towards replacing the
traditional custom-based standard of care.
B. The Physician’s Duty to Stay Abreast
One element of the standard of care for medical malpractice is that a
physician has the duty to keep reasonably abreast of the latest advances in medical
science.77 However, the exact scope of this common law doctrine and its
implications on medical malpractice liability remain unclear. This section describes
the evolution of the duty to stay abreast, highlights the failure of courts to define
the exact scope of this heavily recited doctrine, and concludes with this Note’s
stance on how this duty should be interpreted.
Courts began asserting the duty to stay abreast as early as the mid-nineteenth
century.78 Although courts do not require physicians “to possess extraordinary
knowledge and ability that belongs to a few . . . [courts may require them] ‘to keep
abreast of the times and to practice in accordance with the approved methods and
means of treatment in general use.’”79 While the duty to stay abreast typically
manifests itself as qualifying language within a custom-based standard of care,80

76. E.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423–24 (5th Cir. 1974) (reasoning that patient’s
informed consent precludes physician liability for an experimental procedure).
77. Reed v. Church, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (Va. 1940) (holding that physician was liable for
causing plaintiff’s injury because the physician had easy access to information that clearly warned
against continued drug treatment if vision problems arose); R. CRAWFORD MORRIS & ALAN R.
MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 331 (5th ed. 1971).
78. E.g., McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (Pa. 1853).
[I]n a given case, regard is to be had to the advanced state of the profession at the time.
Discoveries in the natural sciences for the last half-century have exerted a sensible
influence on all the learned professions, but especially on that of medicine, whose circle of
truths has been relatively much enlarged. And besides, there has been a positive progress in
that profession resulting from the studies, the experiments, and the diversified practice of
its professors. The patient is entitled to the benefit of these increased lights. The physician or surgeon who
assumes to exercise the healing art, is bound to be up to the improvements of the day. The standard of
ordinary skill is on the advance; and he who would not be found wanting, must apply
himself with all diligence to the most accredited sources of knowledge.
Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
79. Williams, supra note 38, at 508–09 (quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760 (N.Y.
1898)); see also Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Poysner v. United States,
602 F. Supp. 436, 438–39 (D. Mass. 1984)) (applying Massachusetts law and stating that “[a] physician
is held to the standard of care and skill of the average practitioner of the medical specialty in question,
taking into account the advances in the profession” (citation omitted)); Ward v. United States, 838
F.2d 182, 187 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Ogle v. Noe, 6 Tenn. App. 485 (1927)) (applying Tennessee law
and stating, “In determining the degree of learning and skill required of a medical practitioner in the
treatment of a particular case, regard must be given to the state of medical science at the time.”).
80. Examples of such language include “taking into account,” “having regard to,” or “in light
of” advances in medical science. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Goldstein, 508 N.E.2d 97, 99 (Mass.
1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (“A doctor undertakes to use a reasonable degree of care
such as ordinarily possessed by others providing medical care and treatment, having regard to the
current state of care and treatment.”); Dietsch v. Mayberry, 47 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (recognizing physician’s duty “to exercise the average degree of
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several courts have been more explicit in their pronouncement that physicians
have a legal obligation to keep abreast of medical advances.81
Several court decisions have directly confronted the issue of whether a
physician can escape liability by strictly adhering to medical custom without
considering the adequacy of such custom in light of current medical advances.82 In
Nowatske v. Osterloh, a plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against his physician for
injuries that arose after the defendant performed a scleral buckling procedure to
reattach the patient’s retina.83 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the lower court’s
jury instruction was defective because it equated the legal standard of care with the
medical customary practice without taking current medical advances into
account.84 The plaintiff argued that failure to consider the custom in light of
current science would allow an unreasonable and outdated custom to shield clearly
negligent conduct from malpractice liability.85 In its analysis, the Nowatske court
cited Gates v. Fleisher for the proposition that the current state of medical science is
a relevant factor in the standard of care.86 The Nowatske court reasoned that
“should customary medical practice fail to keep pace with developments and
advances in medical science, adherence to custom might constitute a failure to
exercise reasonable care.”87 The court then concluded that the instruction was
sufficient because the language “due regard for the state of medical science”
accurately informed the jury that the competent physician is one who keeps
abreast of current medical advances.88
The case law makes clear that the duty to keep abreast only extends to
medical information known or available at the time of treatment.89 For instance, in
skill, care, and diligence exercised by members of the same profession . . . in the light of the present
state of medical and surgical science”).
81. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982);
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 273 (Wis. 1996) (“[A] reasonably competent practitioner is
one who keeps up with advances in medical knowledge.”), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins.
Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001).
82. Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968) (finding that where a
physician fails to employ his best judgment, he is not immunized from liability because he followed
customary practice); Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 879–80 (finding that although conventional medical
wisdom was that increased oxygen was essential to the survival of premature infants, defendants were
not relieved of liability when they were clearly aware of the dangers of following the customary
practice); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that custom is never dispositive of
reasonableness where custom itself is lagging behind an established, cost-effective, and scientifically
reliable trend); Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 272 (finding that the standard of care owed by physicians
cannot be established by the sum of the customs which those practitioners follow).
83. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 266.
84. Id. at 269–70.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 271 (citing Gates v. Fleischer, 30 N.W. 674, 675 (Wis. 1886)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 273.
89. McBride v. Saylin, 56 P.2d 941, 941 (Cal. 1936) (stating that a physician’s malpractice
liability depends on whether “the treatment given by the defendant [was] consistent with that
reasonable degree of learning and skill usually possessed and rendered by others of his
profession . . . having regard to the state of scientific learning at the time” (emphasis added)); Tomer v. Am.
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Mallet v. Pirkey, a patient brought a malpractice suit against a physician for injuries
suffered as a result of a prescribed drug’s side effects.90 The court held that the
physician was not liable as a matter of law for the drug’s side effects where “[t]he
medical literature did not reveal any serious complication in its use.”91 In contrast,
the court in Reed v. Church found the defendant physician liable for injuries that
were sustained as a result of a recommended drug treatment92 because the
physician had in his possession pamphlets from the drug manufacturer that listed
blindness as a possible side effect and described the symptoms of its onset.93
Unlike Mallet, the physician in Reed had easy access to medical information that
clearly warned against continued use of the drug if vision problems arose.94 Mallet
and Reed thus define a spectrum in which physicians are held accountable to know
information to which they had reasonable access at the time of the treatment.
Although many cases recite the duty to stay abreast, courts have rarely
addressed what exactly this duty entails.95 Physicians are largely uninformed as to
what it means to “stay abreast” because the current doctrine only defines the duty
in vague terms. The scope of the doctrine is also unclear because courts originally
articulated the duty to stay abreast when medical knowledge progressed at a much
slower pace and staying abreast involved significantly less effort than it does
today.96 But this lack of clarity does not necessarily mean that “the duty to stay
abreast should fall in the face of rapid advances in medical science,” because “such
a paradox would belie the policy that led to the rule in the first place.”97 Instead,
the definition of what it means to stay abreast needs to be fleshed out so as to
instruct physicians on how to avoid liability in light of the nontrivial task of
staying abreast with the fast-paced advances in modern medicine.98
Indeed, current legal scholarship reflects the significant confusion over the
scope of the duty to stay abreast. Some scholars construe the duty to stay abreast
as “a duty to keep abreast of customary medical practice,”99 whereas others believe that
the duty to stay abreast effectively demands “adherence to the state-of-the-art

Home Prods. Corp., 368 A.2d 35, 38 (Conn. 1976) (“[T]he standard of care which was applicable to
the doctors in the use of Halothane was dependent upon the state of their art at the time that they were
allegedly negligent.” (emphasis added)); King v. Ditto, 19 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1933) (“As a general
rule, the degree of care and skill depends somewhat upon . . . the advanced state of medical and surgical
science at the time services to patient were rendered. . . . What might have been considered due care twenty
years ago would be gross negligence to-day.” (emphasis added)).
90. Mallet v. Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466, 468 (Colo. 1970).
91. Id. at 470.
92. Reed v. Church, 8 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Va. 1940).
93. Id. at 290.
94. Id.
95. For examples of formulations of the duty to stay abreast, see supra note 89.
96. Williams, supra note 38, at 513.
97. Id. at 514.
98. Id.
99. Kacmar, supra note 37, at 641.
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rather than simply [abiding by] existing custom.”100 This Note takes a more
conservative stance than the latter viewpoint and contends that, at minimum, “the
duty to stay abreast” entails more than keeping up with customary medical
practice101 because adhering to a custom-based standard may actually serve to
entrench poor or harmful customs into mainstream practice,102 which is contrary
to the doctrine’s intended purpose (i.e., permitting the standard of care to evolve
in response to medical advances). Moreover, the scope of the duty to stay abreast
must align with the “best judgment” rule, a parallel common law doctrine that
expressly permits departure from customary practices in the event that a physician
becomes aware of new medical information that impacts treatment decisions. For
example, in Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, the court considered whether the
defendants, a physician and a hospital, were liable for injuries the plaintiff incurred
due to prolonged oxygen exposure following the plaintiff’s premature birth.103 The
defendants argued that they should be insulated from liability because they acted
in accordance with conventional medical wisdom that considered increased
oxygen essential to the survival of premature babies.104 The Burton court imposed
liability because the defendants were clearly aware of the dangers of administrating
excess oxygen to premature babies at the time of treatment based on several
research studies, including their own.105 The Burton court effectively held that the
defendants were liable for failing to keep up with the latest medical advances and
failing to exercise sound medical judgment when they were aware of the dangers
of a generally accepted customary practice.106 The duty to stay abreast is thus
tightly intertwined with the “best judgment” rule, which requires a physician to
employ his expertise, or best judgment, when he acquires new, relevant medical
information, regardless of existing customary practices.
Awareness of medical information thus impacts both treatment decisions
100. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 A RIZ. L. REV. 373, 463 (2002).
101. A comparison to how other professionals view the duty to stay abreast might be useful in
ascertaining what exactly this duty entails for medical practitioners. For instance, attorneys appear to
be held to a more pronounced duty to stay abreast in that they face a higher risk of liability if they do
not keep up with the latest changes in the law. See Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect
of the Information Age on Physicians’ Professional Liability, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 92 (1986) (stating that
failure to Shepardize is a way in which “an attorney’s failure to keep abreast in law can easily result in
malpractice liability”); see also Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating
that the court does not expect the attorney “to be infallible,” but does expect him to conduct that
degree of research sufficient to enable the client “to make an informed decision”). Courts have
explained that attorneys have a duty to not only know “plain and elementary principles of law which
are commonly known by well-informed attorneys,” but must also “discover those additional rules of
law which, although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research techniques.”
Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975). Thus in the context of the law of legal malpractice, the
duty to stay abreast goes beyond keeping up with customary norms within the profession.
102. See Kacmar, supra note 37, at 642–43.
103. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1982).
104. Id. at 879–80.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372–73 (N.Y. 1968).
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and the applicable standard of care. Advances in information technology over the
past two decades provide physicians with rapid access to cutting-edge medical
research, allowing them to evaluate diagnostic and treatment decisions against
broader background information. Consequently, the scope of the physician’s duty
to stay abreast will continue to evolve as breakthroughs in information
dissemination and medical science occur.
C. Clinical Practice Guidelines:
An Incomplete Solution to Defining the Standard of Care
Applying rapid advances in fields such as cell biology, genomics,
immunology, and pharmacology to medical practice poses a dual challenge. On
one hand, new scientific information reported in the literature fails to efficiently
translate into new practice styles.107 Conversely, there are concerns that expensive,
new technology may be adopted uncritically before its efficacy is adequately
assessed.108 Because of this apparent lack of coordination between technology
assessment and clinical practice,109 and the lack of consensus as to what the best
methods and treatments are,110 various medical professional societies have
promulgated CPGs to evaluate the efficacy of various medical practices.111 CPGs
are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”112 In
addition to coordinating technology assessment and clinical practice,113 and

107. Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science: The Diffusion of New
Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 5, 5 (1988) (describing
physician skepticism of new procedures and reliance upon tradition); Edward J. Huth, The Underused
Medical Literature, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 99, 99 (1989) (citing “time and effort” involved in
obtaining information from the literature as the primary barrier to incorporation into practice).
108. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE E FFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES 93–94 (1978); Greer, supra note 107, at 5–6 (“Technologies believed to be
efficacious are often very slow in achieving an impact, while technologies of questionable value
diffuse rapidly . . . .”).
109. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 108, at 89–90.
110. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., H EALTH LAW: CASES, M ATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 12
(6th ed. 2008) (“Although there are generally accepted treatments for many diseases, and doctors can
agree that there has been bad care in some cases, for many others there are no generally agreed
standards of what is ‘the best’ care.”).
111. See, e.g., J. Sanford Schwartz et al., Safety, Efficacy, and Effectiveness of Clinical Practices: A New
Initiative, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 246 (1982); Practice Committee Documents, AM. SOC’Y FOR
REPROD. MED. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.asrm.org/Guidelines; Clinical Practice Guidelines, NAT’L
HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-pro/guidelines.
Scholars estimate the number of CPGs currently in existence to range from 1600 to 2000. See
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 685 (2001) (noting that more than 1600 guidelines exist); Noah,
supra note 100, at 418 (“More than 2000 guidelines exist today.”).
112. INST. OF M ED ., G UIDELINES FOR C LINICAL P RACTICE : F ROM D EVELOPMENT TO
U SE 27 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992).
113. See Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial
Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1488–89 (1989) (explaining development
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expressing a consensus on the best practices,114 CPGs help counter the
information explosion in medicine115 by providing a necessary abridgement of the
scientific literature116 and reflecting the judgments of leaders in the medical
community.117 CPGs have also been used as barometers for establishing
conventional standards of care in some jurisdictions.118
However, the use of CPGs to define the appropriate standard of care is not
without its criticisms. First, many physicians construe CPGs as an impediment to
exercising independent clinical judgment,119 especially when there may be more
than one effective treatment in a given instance.120 Physicians may feel unduly
compelled to adhere to CPGs, even if the guidelines conflict with a physician’s
best judgment, because of underlying liability concerns that could potentially lead
to adverse patient outcomes.121 Second, many CPGs are vague and based on
generalities, thus providing limited assistance for diagnosing or treating a particular
patient.122 Third, significant credibility problems may also arise where the
recommended guidelines are biased by the self-interests of the standard-setting
organizations.123 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, CPGs will invariably lag
and endorsement of practice guidelines as response to “apparent lack of coordination between
technology assessment and clinical practice”).
114. See Williams, supra note 38, at 489 n.53 (noting that CPGs can help “articulate consensus
on acceptable practice” and “disseminate information on the consensus” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
115. See Leahy, supra note 113, at 1487–91 (explaining how explosion of medical information
necessitates CPGs).
116. See Noah, supra note 100, at 418 (“If nothing else, practice guidelines provide a handy
abridgement of the burgeoning biomedical literature.”).
117. Id. (“[CPGs] also serve a signaling function, reflecting the judgments of leading experts in
the field”).
118. See Linda L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J.
ONCOLOGY PRAC. 254 (2007); Timothy K. Mackey & Bryan A. Liang, The Role of Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 VIRTUAL MENTOR 36, 37–38 (2011). The use of CPGs as exculpatory
evidence of malpractice has been given special scrutiny due to its use in Maine’s Medical Liability
Demonstration Project in the 1990s. Mello, supra note 111, at 674–77. Under the reform, physicians
who complied with the twenty state-adopted CPGs were provided an affirmative defense against
medical malpractice claims. Id. at 675. Unfortunately, the project did not show significant reductions
in defensive medicine practices or in malpractice claims, and the law’s provisions had low utilization
in court. Id. at 676.
119. INST. OF MED., supra note 112, at 24 (“[M]any physicians, especially those longer in
practice, see guidelines as a challenge to clinical judgment and resist them as a threat to the most
fundamental element of professional autonomy.”).
120. See Williams, supra note 38, at 491 n.65 (“Substantial regional variations exist in the use of
many procedures, with no apparent differences in outcome.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
121. Mackey & Liang, supra note 118, at 39.
122. See E. Haavi Morreim, Commentary, From the Clinics to the Courts: The Role Evidence Should
Play in Litigating Medical Care, 26 J. H EALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 409, 422 (2001) (“[E]ven the best CPGs
cannot possibly dictate each patient’s course of care. They are based on generalities that hold true on
average, but have only limited room to accommodate the natural variations among individuals in any
population.”).
123. See Noah, supra note 100, at 422 (“When specialty medical societies sponsor clinical
practice guidelines, the financial interests of their members may influence the resolution of contested
issues.”).
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behind current advances in medical science because professional associations can
take years to formulate and codify guidelines.124 CPGs cannot always reflect the
current best evidence. “Even if a guideline reflects current best evidence when
written, medical advances could soon render such a guideline obsolete.”125
“[G]uidelines may [thus] have the effect of freezing the standard of care, thereby
discouraging further research and innovation in areas [where] the experts have
reached a consensus.”126 This inherent lack of dynamism perpetuates
inconsistencies within the standard of care analysis for emerging technologies,
thereby weighing against a legal framework that is solely based on CPGs.
Given the problems associated with the CPG standard, it would be unwise
for courts to demand lockstep adherence to any given CPG.127 Instead, an optimal
standard of care is one that encourages physicians to keep informed of current
medical knowledge and practice accordingly. This is not to say that CPGs lack
any significance. Rather, physicians should not only be aware of CPG
recommendations, but also of how other evidence alters those
recommendations.128 In other words, while CPGs can reflect current best
evidence at the time that they are promulgated, subsequent advances in medical
science may interpret, refine, or overturn them.129 Thus, while CPGs remain a
significant factor in the standard of care analysis, they are not dispositive of a
physician’s liability for malpractice.
D. Informed Consent: The Duty to Inform of Alternative Treatments
The doctrine of informed consent is part of the general evolution of
attitudes about the doctor-patient relationship, including “the growing belief that
patients are entitled to more information about their health, as well as a real and
informed role in decisions about their medical treatment.”130 One aspect of the
informed consent doctrine is the duty to inform the patient of appropriate
alternative treatments.131 To prove a medical malpractice claim due to negligent
nondisclosure of an alternative treatment plan, the plaintiff must establish: (a) a
duty on the part of the physician to know of an alternative treatment,132 and (b) a
duty to disclose the alternative treatment plan “by evidence establishing that a
reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have known to be the
patient’s position would likely attach significance to that . . . alternative in

124.
WHITTIER
adopted).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care Reform, 16
L. REV. 157, 176 (1995) (identifying the concern that CPGs will be outdated before
Williams, supra note 38, at 487–88.
Noah, supra note 100, at 425.
Morreim, supra note 122, at 422.
Williams, supra note 38, at 525–26.
Id.
Prillaman, supra note 72, at 46.
Id.
This duty parallels the duty to stay abreast described infra in Part II.B.
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formulating his decision to consent to treatment.”133 Unlike a typical medical
malpractice claim, the injury sustained under an informed consent claim is not
necessarily an injury resulting from negligent medical treatment.134 The critical
factor is whether the injury would have been avoided if the plaintiff had chosen an
undisclosed alternative treatment.
Courts adopt one of two approaches to the duty to obtain informed consent.
Some jurisdictions apply a “professional” standard of informed consent, which
requires a physician to inform the patient of alternatives to the recommended
medical treatment as would other physicians practicing in the community.135 Thus,
under the professional standard, the defendant physician’s conduct is measured in
relation to the level of care given by other practitioners in the relevant community.
Other states apply the “lay” standard of informed consent, where the physician
has a duty to inform the patient of all the information a reasonable patient would
wish to know in making an informed decision as to whether to undergo the
proposed treatment.136 Thus, the driving force behind the lay standard is
protecting the patient’s rights of self-determination and bodily autonomy.
Under either the professional or lay approach to informed consent, the
physician has the duty to inform the patient of appropriate alternative treatments,
and to describe the risks and benefits of those treatments.137 Of course, this duty
does not require a physician to disclose every possible alternative to every detail of
the proposed treatment. Rather, the physician must engage in a dialogue that
“involves choosing among medically acceptable options, not simply accepting or
rejecting the medically preferable option.”138 For instance, in Keogan v. Holy Family
Hospital, a physician gave a resting electrocardiogram (EKG) to a thirty-sevenyear-old patient with chest pain, but did not inform him of a treadmill EKG or an
angiography as medically acceptable options.139 The court held that the physician
had a duty to disclose alternative diagnostic procedures once he had knowledge of
a physical abnormality in the patient, and that the physician was negligent as a
matter of law for his failure to disclose the alternative diagnostic procedures.140
Thus, the duty to inform patients of alternative treatments has a profound effect
133. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 44 (quoting Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640
(Minn. 1980)).
134. In fact, the injury may even be a fully expected outcome of the recommended medical
treatment.
135. E.g., Ziegert v. S. Chi. Cmty. Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
136. E.g., Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Some courts apply an objective
test, which requires a showing that a reasonable person would have made a different choice if
informed of the alternative. Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 751 S.W.2d
175 (Tex. 1988). Whereas other courts require the patient to prove subjectively that disclosure of the
alternative would have altered her decision to consent to the proposed treatment. Spencer v. Seikel,
742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987).
137. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 46–47.
138. A PPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL P RACTICE
54 (1987) (emphasis added).
139. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wash. 1980).
140. Id. at 1252–53.
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on the doctor-patient relationship because it effectively obligates the physician to
defend her choice of treatment, compared to other medically acceptable
alternatives, to the patient.141 The rule goes beyond ensuring that the patient is
made aware of the dangers of the recommended treatment and effectively reserves
a role for the patient in the clinical decision-making process.142
The case law makes clear that the touchstone for determining whether an
alternative treatment must be disclosed is that the treatment be “medically
acceptable.” Thus, courts are confronted with the task of defining (a) what makes
a particular treatment, especially a new one, acceptable; and (b) to whom it must
be acceptable. To this end, scholars have enumerated several criteria to evaluate
when a new treatment becomes sufficiently “acceptable” to trigger the duty to
disclose.143 These criteria include (a) approval of a drug or device by the FDA for
a particular indication, (b) official acceptance of a new medical treatment by a
professional medical society,144 (c) whether the effectiveness of the new treatment
has been demonstrated through articles in peer-reviewed medical journals or
leading textbooks of the relevant specialty,145 (d) whether the new treatment is
accepted as appropriate by a substantial percentage (or respectable minority) of
practitioners in the relevant specialty, and (e) whether the physician has individual
knowledge of a new treatment. All of the enumerated factors potentially could be
used by experts in formulating their opinions as to whether the practitioner was
reasonable in her assessment of whether the alternative treatment was medically
acceptable.
Some courts, including those applying the lay standard of informed consent,
have implicitly recognized that the standard for “medical acceptability” should be
based on the perceptions of the reasonable practitioner.146 Thus, the relevant
141. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 47.
142. Some courts believe that improved access to information may broaden the physician’s
duty of informed consent. Harnish v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Mass. 1982)
(stating that a doctor must “disclose in a reasonable manner all significant medical information that
the physician possesses or reasonably should possess that is material to an intelligent decision by the
patient whether to undergo a proposed procedure” (emphasis added)).
143. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 53–57.
144. However, this approach would lead to a conflict between the patients’ interests and the
professional organization’s interest in protecting its own members. It would also exclude
recommended treatments by reputable groups dissenting from the professional society’s view.
145. There are several caveats with the leading textbook approach. It is practically impossible
to keep textbooks up to date given the rapidly changing realm of modern medical science. No leading,
general textbook is updated on more than a yearly basis and many specialty textbooks are updated far
less frequently.
146. See, e.g., Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 843, 849 (La. Ct. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (Md. 1977); Getchell
v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953, 957 (Or. 1971); Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 1987). Expert
testimony is necessary to establish that an alternative treatment is “feasible” but not to establish
whether it must be disclosed. Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 861 (Wash. App. 1974) (“There is no
need to prove what other doctors might tell their patients in similar circumstances.”), aff’d, 530 P.2d
334 (Wash. 1975), superseded by statute, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.050 (West 2011), as recognized in
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007).
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inquiry is whether the reasonable physician would believe that the treatment was
accepted as an appropriate treatment by a substantial percentage of reputable
experts in the field, rather than whether the individual physician believes that the
treatment is feasible. Under this standard, a physician could avoid the danger of
having to disclose treatments that are either suspect or too new to have a track
record, but would still be obligated to keep up with the relevant literature and
other sources of information, and to inform patients of new treatments as they
meet the criteria for medical acceptance.
III. APPLICATION OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO A
PHYSICIAN’S DUTY TO OFFER AND PROVIDE OPTIMIZED
PGS-ANEUPLOIDY SCREENING SERVICES
A. The Inadequacy of a Custom-Based Standard of Care for PGS
As an initial matter, this Note contends that it is illogical for courts to apply a
custom-based standard in determining a physician’s standard of care for adopting
technological advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening. As mentioned earlier, the
malpractice standard of care is evolutionary because it assumes and depends upon
changes in medical knowledge and the innovation of new technologies. Because
emerging technologies differ from traditional modalities of treatment, most
practitioners have not yet adopted them. Therefore, one consequence of
maintaining a custom-based standard of care is that physicians may be reluctant to
incorporate state-of-the-art procedures and devices that offer new or improved
clinical benefits since, generally, these technologies have not yet been accepted by
the medical community.147 This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that there is
significant lag time between discovery and general acceptance by the profession.148
Adhering to a custom-based standard of care makes little sense where highgrade scientific evidence suggests deviating from a customary medical practice that
is ineffective or poses unnecessary clinical risks to patients. In the context of PGSaneuploidy screening, FISH has traditionally been the method of choice used to
examine chromosomal abnormalities in biopsied material retrieved from cleavagestage embryos,149 and various FISH protocols only permit physicians to screen
five to nine chromosomes per embryo, as opposed to the whole chromosome
complement.150 Thus, FISH would inherently yield a certain number of falsenegative results because the abnormalities may be present on chromosomes that
147. See Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine,
23 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 471 (2002).
148. See id. at 485 (“Acceptance of new practice approaches engendered by new technology
takes time . . . .”).
149. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 290.
150. E.g., Pere Colls et al., Increased Efficiency of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Infertility Using
“No Result Rescue,” 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 53 (2007); A. Mantzouratou et al., Variable Aneuploidy
Mechanisms in Embryos from Couples with Poor Reproductive Histories Undergoing Preimplantation Genetic
Screening, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1844 (2007).
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are not scored. The procedure is further complicated by the fact that cleavagestage embryos tend to be mosaic, which can lead to additional errors in
classification.151 Over the past five years, several randomized clinical trials have
reported that the use of FISH-based screening methods at the cleavage stage can
negatively impact the likelihood of establishing a clinical pregnancy.152 Subsequent
studies demonstrated that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies
have superior diagnostic potential on account of their high accuracy and precision
rates.153 For instance, CGH-based screening detects forty-two percent more
chromosomal errors in cleavage-stage embryos than the most sensitive FISHbased protocol,154 and yields significantly lower error rates compared to FISH
analysis.155 Additionally, improved biopsy procedures are less likely to damage the
embryos, thereby increasing the likelihood of establishing a clinical pregnancy via
the preferential transfer of viable, normal embryos. Under these circumstances, a
physician may reasonably believe that she can serve the patient’s best interests by
deviating from traditional PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques and employing
optimized strategies that yield more promising results. But under a custom-based
standard of care, a physician might not act in accordance with her best judgment
because she realizes that departure from custom would leave her vulnerable to
malpractice liability. Indeed, the physician may be inclined to adhere to outdated,
and often harmful, customary medical practices until the new technologies are
generally accepted in the profession.156

151. Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 16.
152. See, e.g., Christophe Blockeel et al., Prospectively Randomized Controlled Trial of PGS in
IVF/ICSI Patients with Poor Implantation, 17 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 848, 848–54 (2008);
Sophie Debrock et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening for Aneuploidy of Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization
in Women Aged at Least 35 Years: A Prospective Randomized Trial, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 364, 364–
73 (2010); Hardarson et al., supra note 16, at 2806–12; Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 9–17;
Jennifer E. Mersereau et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening to Improve In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancy
Rates: A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1287, 1287–89 (2008); Liza
R. Meyer et al., A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial of Preimplantation Genetic Screening in the “Good
Prognosis” Patient, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1731, 1731–38 (2009); William B. Schoolcraft et al.,
Preimplantation Aneuploidy Testing for Infertile Patients of Advanced Maternal Age: A Randomized Prospective
Trial, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 157, 157–62 (2009); C. Staessen et al., Preimplantation Genetic
Screening Does Not Improve Delivery Rate in Women Under the Age of 36 Following Single-Embryo Transfer, 23
HUM. REPROD. 2818, 2818–25 (2008).
153. See supra note 30.
154. Cristina Gutiérrez-Mateo et al., Validation of Microarray Comparative Genomic Hybridization for
Comprehensive Chromosome Analysis of Embryos, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 953, 955 (2011).
155. Id. at 955 (demonstrating that error rates for optimal CGH protocol were generally lower
compared with those reported with the use of FISH).
156. Kacmar, supra note 37, at 621 (“Ordinarily, until the medical community adopts a
particular procedure, technique, or methodology, a physician is not negligent for failing to discover,
consider, or adopt it.”). It is possible that physicians practicing in some custom-based jurisdictions
might find safe harbor under the “respectable minority” or “two schools of thought” rule. But the
mere existence of this safe harbor might not be enough to persuade physicians to depart from
customary practices because jurisdictions vary widely in the language used to define the standard. See
Michael Kowalski, Applying the “Two Schools of Thought” Doctrine to the Repressed Memory Controversy, 19 J.
LEGAL MED. 503, 505–23 (1998).
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The status quo of PGS-aneuploidy screening in reproductive medicine
mirrors the factual circumstances described in Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital,
where the medical-community custom was clearly lagging behind a recognized,
scientifically reliable trend, and the defendant physician was fully aware of the
dangers of following the harmful customary practice.157 This is precisely the sort
of situation where courts have been willing to disregard custom and resolve the
predicament by judicial fiat.158 A custom-based standard of care is thus
inappropriate in the context of PGS-aneuploidy screening because it decreases
physician autonomy with respect to incorporating state-of-the-art procedures,
hinders the pace of innovation, and perpetuates a substandard level of care that
can lead to adverse patient outcomes.
B. A Standard of Care Based Solely on CPGs Is Insufficient
The ASRM’s existing CPGs on PGS-aneuploidy screening should not serve
as the sole barometer in evaluating good medical practice. Presently, the ASRM
offers no guidance on preferred PGS-aneuploidy screening protocols,159 but
specifies that PGS is an experimental procedure “that should be performed only
with the specific review of a properly constituted Institutional Review Board.”160
In fact, blind reliance on the ASRM’s current recommendations against the
“routine [use of] preimplantation embryo aneuploidy screening” 161 for infertile
patients is no longer justified because the guidelines no longer reflect the current
best evidence.162 The ASRM’s existing guidelines were formulated based on
research studies that used FISH-based screening methods in cleavage-stage
embryos,163 and the ASRM has yet to issue guidelines that consider recent
advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening, including CGH, CCS, SNP microarrays,
and improved embryo biopsy procedures. Additionally, physicians would not be
fulfilling their fiduciary obligations by merely searching for updates in PGSaneuploidy screening practice guidelines because, apart from the most remarkable
discoveries, there is always a delay before a professional society endorses any
promising innovative technology.164 This is largely due to the fact that many
157. See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982).
158. See Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968); Burton, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 879–80; Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d
265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001).
159. See SART & ASRM, supra note 3; ASRM, supra note 5.
160. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Definition of “Experimental Procedures,”
92 FERTILITY & S TERILITY 1517, 1517 (2009).
161. ASRM, supra note 5, at 1105.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., M.T.M. Franssen et al., Reproductive Outcome After PGD in Couples with Recurrent
Miscarriage Carrying a Structural Chromosome Abnormality: A Systematic Review, 17 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE
467 (2011); Jennifer Hirshfeld-Cytron et al., Management of Recurrent Pregnancy Loss Associated with a
Parental Carrier of a Reciprocal Translocation: A Systematic Review, 29 SEMINARS REPROD. MED. 470, 470–
81 (2011).
164. For example, the ASRM waited almost twenty years before removing the “experimental”
label from embryo freezing protocols. Fertility Experts Issue New Report on Egg Freezing: ASRM Lifts
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CPGs, like customary practices, are based on current medical consensus.165 Thus,
ART physicians should not solely rely on the ASRM’s existing CPGs concerning
PGS-aneuploidy screening, because doing so may actually compromise the best
interests of their existing patients.
C. The “Reasonable Physician” Standard: The Optimal Framework
for Defining a Physician’s Duty to Adopt Emerging PGS Technologies
The “reasonable physician” standard is the most suitable approach to
defining the standard of care owed by ART physicians in the context of providing
optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening. Usually, the reasonable physician standard is
informed by reference to what other physicians would do when confronted with
similar circumstances. But the reasonable physician standard takes on an added
layer of complexity when the use of a new medical technology is implicated,
particularly where the technology involves a transformation in related procedures
or processes of medical care.166 Under such circumstances, physicians are
expected to take steps to ensure that the new technology is appropriate for a
particular patient, thereby mitigating their risk of liability.167 These steps include
(a) acquiring knowledge about the safety and effectiveness of the new technology
and of the scientific evidence base that supports it, (b) obtaining appropriate
training and expertise prior to actually using the technology, (c) evaluating any
specific risks posed by the technology in connection with particular types of
procedures or patients, and (d) receiving informed consent from their patients
prior to undertaking medical procedures on a nonemergency basis.168 Simply put,
the reasonable physician standard would essentially incorporate a cost-benefit
analysis whenever a new treatment modality is involved.169
The seminal case of Helling v. Carey is one such example that integrates costbenefit analysis into the reasonable physician standard.170 In Helling, the plaintiff
sued her ophthalmologist for failing to give her a simple, painless, and inexpensive
test that would have detected her glaucoma before her symptoms got worse.171
The defendant argued that his decision was consistent with the customary norms
of the profession, which did not require the routine administration of the test to
‘Experimental’ Label from Technique, ASRM (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.asrm.org/news/article.aspx?id
=10358.
165. Williams, supra note 38, at 524.
166. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 432.
167. Id. at 434–37.
168. These criteria are identical to the ones courts consider when assessing whether a
physician has breached the standard of care by adopting a noncustomary medical practice. See Bergero
v. Univ. of S. Cal. Keck Sch. of Med., No. B200595, 2009 WL 946874, at *9–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9,
2009) (finding that defendant physician was not liable for malpractice for recommending and
providing PGD via PCR instead of FISH).
169. See Williams, supra note 38, at 519–21 (integrating both cost-benefit analysis and the
reasonable physician standard as a potential standard of care for evidence-based medicine).
170. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 981 (Wash. 1974).
171. Id. at 981–82.
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patients her age.172 The plaintiff contended that adherence to the medical custom
of not administrating routine pressure tests was not dispositive of
reasonableness.173 The court found the physician liable and held that the
reasonable standard of care that should have been followed was to administer the
inexpensive, harmless, and effective glaucoma pressure test, regardless of what
was customary at the time.174 Since Helling, glaucoma pressure tests have become
“a routine part of every eye examination,” regardless of age.175 Like the glaucoma
pressure test in Helling, optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques involving
trophectoderm biopsy and comprehensive chromosomal screening methods, such
as array-CGH, SNP microarrays, and qPCR, also have the ability to transform
related procedures in reproductive medicine. Optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening methods are highly predictive of the reproductive potential of human
embryos,176 and may be used to increase pregnancy rates and decrease risks of
spontaneous abortion and chromosomal syndromes in infertile patients.177
Furthermore, the high embryo implantation rates achieved through optimized
PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques mark an extremely significant milestone for
IVF clinics attempting to circumvent the problem of multiple births via single
embryo transfer.178 These promising results also signal that the rate of
misdiagnosis is much lower with optimized methodologies than when compared
to traditional PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques. Unlike the traditional embryo
biopsy procedure at the cleavage stage, which requires a high degree of technical
proficiency,179 and is associated with some risk of reduced implantation
172. Id. at 982.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 983–84.
175. Veronica M. O’Hern, Medicolegal Rounds, 230 JAMA 1577, 1578 (1974).
176. R.T. Scott, Jr. et al., Comprehensive Chromosome Screening Is Highly Predictive of the Reproductive
Potential of Human Embryos: A Prospective, Blinded, Nonselection Study, 97 FERTILITY & STERILITY 870,
870–75 (2012).
177. Studies using optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening report significantly higher
implantation rates and ongoing pregnancy rates compared to unscreened control groups, despite
disparities in maternal age or poor medical history. Forman et al., supra note 30, at 1217; Schoolcraft
et al., supra note 21, at 1700; Scott, Jr. et al., supra note 30, at S2.
178. See Forman et al., supra note 31, at S49; William B. Schoolcraft & Mandy G. Katz-Jaffe,
Comprehensive Chromosome Screening of Trophectoderm with Vitrification Facilitates Elective Single-Embryo Transfer
for Infertile Women with Advanced Maternal Age, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 615, 617–18 (2013)
(reporting higher implantation rates, higher ongoing pregnancy rates, and lower spontaneous
miscarriage rates in advanced maternal age (AMA) patients following blastocyst CCS with vitrification
and frozen single embryo transfer compared with AMA patients in the non-CCS group that
underwent single embryo transfer. AMA patients in the CCS group had reproductive outcomes
similar to their younger counterparts following blastocyst CCS with vitrification and frozen embryo
transfer); Yang et al., supra note 31, at 24.
179. King, supra note 19, at 307 (“[I]mprecise or unskilled embryo biopsy can substantially
harm the embryo, preventing implantation and development.”). For instance, PGS practitioners have
questioned the quality of the embryo biopsy procedures performed in the seminal Mastenbroek study,
as approximately twenty percent of embryos in the PGS group had “undetermined” chromosomal
status compared with five percent in experienced laboratories. See Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at
16 tbl.4; PGD Pioneers, supra note 21.
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potential,180 almost every cultured blastocyst subjected to trophectoderm biopsy
survives the procedure.181 Thus, trophectoderm sampling is a much simpler, safer
alternative. Lastly, improvements in DNA sequencing have made it increasingly
practical to generate large amounts of sequence data with the use of highthroughput next-generation sequencing (NGS) machines, for which the cost per
reaction is falling drastically.182 Studies are currently underway to evaluate the
feasibility of NGS for preimplantation embryo assessment, which, if successful,
would significantly lower the costs of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening.183
One caveat of the optimized technology is that it disadvantages patients who
suffer from diminished ovarian reserve (DOR).184 DOR patients produce poorquality oocytes and embryos, and only have a small number of embryos available
for trophectoderm biopsy.185 Thus, women with DOR cannot be expected to
derive outcome benefits from day-five blastocyst transfers compared to day-three
cleavage-stage embryo transfers.186 However, even under this scenario, a physician
who is leaning toward providing optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening would still
be able to mitigate the risk of liability. First, the physician must receive the
patient’s informed consent after disclosing the risks and benefits of both the
recommended treatment and the medically acceptable alternatives. Second, the
physician would still have to exercise his or her best judgment and alter the course
of treatment in the event that early warning symptoms arise. For instance, the
physician would suspect that a patient suffers from DOR based on the low
numbers of cleavage-stage embryos. At that moment, the physician could point
the patient toward other medically acceptable alternatives (such as day-three
embryo transfer without PGS screening or oocyte donation) and alter the course
of treatment accordingly. Given these circumstances, a reasonable physician may
conclude that the risk of liability for adopting optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening is not as daunting as it would seem at first blush. The reasonable
physician standard thus eliminates the hurdles that a custom-based standard places
on ART physicians desiring to disregard customary practices, and allows the
standard of care to evolve in response to medical advances.

180. Cohen et al., supra note 20; Cohen & Grifo, supra note 21.
181. See studies cited supra note 31. In fact, critics question the value of retaining traditional
PGS-aneuploidy screening methods given the technical proficiency barriers. See Fragouli & Wells,
supra note 2, at 291 (“[E]ven if it is true that FISH-based analyses can be beneficial, the fact that so
few laboratories are able to demonstrate any efficacy is indicative of a technology that is not
sufficiently robust, leading to problems applying it in different laboratories.”).
182. Julio Martin et al., The Impact of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and Screening, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1054, 1055 (2013).
183. XuYang Yin et al., Massively Parallel Sequencing for Chromosomal Abnormality Testing in
Trophectoderm Cells of Human Blastocysts, 88 BIOLOGY REPROD. 69 (2013).
184. Norbert Gleicher & David H. Barad, A Review of, and Commentary on, the Ongoing Second
Clinical Introduction of Preimplantation Genetic Screening (PGS) to Routine IVF Practice, 29 J. ASSISTED
REPROD. & GENETICS 1159, 1163 (2012).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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C. Dismissing Objections to the Proposed Standard of Care
One may contend that physicians have no duty to offer patients optimized
PGS-aneuploidy screenings because the treatment is still experimental. Indeed,
some courts have held that experimental treatments are not therapies that fall
within the definition of medically acceptable alternatives.187 This Note contends
that optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening no longer fits within the ASRM’s
definition of “experimental procedures,” and thus should not be classified as such.
According to the ASRM, “[p]rocedures (including tests, treatments, or other
interventions) for the diagnosis or treatment of infertility will be considered
experimental or investigational until the published medical evidence regarding
their risks, benefits, and overall safety and efficacy is sufficient to regard them as
established medical practice.”188 The ASRM states that “relevant medical evidence
can derive only from appropriately designed, peer-reviewed, published studies
performed by multiple independent investigators, including a description of
materials and methods sufficient to assess their scientific validity and to allow
independent verification.”189 Several influential studies demonstrate that
comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies are highly predictive of the
implantation potential of human embryos,190 and that blastocyst biopsy is safer
and thus preferable to cleavage-stage embryo biopsy.191 Numerous clinical trials
have since combined blastocyst biopsy with comprehensive molecular cytogenetic
methodologies to assess their overall efficacy in improving reproductive
outcomes.192 Implantation rates and ongoing pregnancy rates using optimized
PGS-aneuploidy screening are significantly higher compared to untreated controls,
a trend that has been consistent across multiple studies from independent groups,
regardless of age or medical prognosis.193 Another recent study has revealed that
qPCR-based CCS is comparable with the current standard of care (double
unscreened embryo transfer), and eliminates the problem of multiple pregnancy.194
As of August 2012, optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening methods have been used
in more than 3000 IVF cycles at nine centers in the United States.195 This trend
187. Garrett v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 1147, 1162–63 (W.D. La. 1987) (“This court will
not find malpractice in the treating physician’s failure to adopt a ‘controversial’ treatment modality
which is not commonly accepted in the medical profession. . . . This court would violate the longestablished standard of care for physicians if it held a doctor liable for failing to use experimental and
unproven treatment on one of his patients.”); Del Valle Rivera v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 750,
755–56 (D.P.R. 1986).
188. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 160, at 1517.
189. Id.
190. Scott, Jr. et al., supra note 176, at 870.
191. McArthur et al., supra note 29, at 1628; N.R. Treff et al., Cleavage Stage Embryo Biopsy
Significantly Impairs Embryonic Reproductive Potential While Blastocyst Biopsy Does Not: A Novel Paired Analysis
of Cotransferred Biopsied and Nonbiopsied Sibling Embryos, 96 FERTILITY & STERILITY S2 (2011).
192. See studies cited supra notes 29–31.
193. Forman et al., supra note 30, at 1217; Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1700; Scott, Jr. et
al., supra note 30, at S2; Yang et al., supra note 31, at 24.
194. Forman et al., supra note 31, at S49.
195. Nathan R. Treff & Richard T. Scott, Jr., Four-Hour Quantitative Real-Time Polymerase Chain
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also suggests that there is a substantial percentage of reputable experts within the
field of reproductive medicine that favor optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening
methodologies over generally accepted methods involving FISH and cleavagestage biopsy. Furthermore, a few scholars have expressed optimism about
universally applying improved PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques with routine
IVF procedures for patients in all age groups.196 The well-designed, peer-reviewed,
published studies referenced above represent the accuracy, safety, and clinical
efficacy of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques. Therefore, under the
ASRM’s own guidelines, PGS should no longer be classified as an experimental
procedure.
And even if optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening retains the “experimental”
classification, a physician is still not absolved of the duty to inform patients of the
existence of the experimental treatment if it is accepted as an appropriate
treatment by some substantial percentage of practitioners in the relevant
specialty.197 In Wachter v. United States, the physician failed to inform the patient of
the possibility to use the internal mammary artery for a coronary bypass operation
instead of the saphenous vein.198 Applying the lay standard of informed consent,
the court held that the internal mammary artery procedure was not a “medically
significant alternative” because the procedure was not a choice among treatment
modalities.199 The court explained that the procedure was not in general use, not
then known among surgeons to produce better results, and not the subject of any
definitive study showing it would be better to use than a saphenous vein graft in a
coronary bypass operation.200 Unlike Wachter, optimized PGS-aneuploidy
screening techniques are medically acceptable alternatives because they have been
repeatedly scrutinized during numerous clinical trials, and were found to be safer,
more accurate, and more efficacious than traditional PGS screening methods.201
Indeed, specialists who make a good-faith effort to keep abreast of current
advances in ART would know that the application of these optimized techniques
results in superior clinical outcomes, regardless of the patient’s age or poor
Reaction–Based Comprehensive Chromosome Screening and Accumulating Evidence of Accuracy, Safety, Predictive
Value, and Clinical Efficacy, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1049, 1052 (2013).
196. Id. (“Together these data suggest that it is feasible to universally apply blastocyst qPCRbased CCS without compromising transfer rates and significantly improving overall clinical outcomes,
reducing miscarriage rates, and nearly eliminating multiple gestations in all age groups.”); see also Joe
Leigh Simpson, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Improve Pregnancy Outcomes in Subfertility, 26 BEST
PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 805, 805 (2012) (“Current
recommendations are for obligatory 24 chromosome testing, most readily using array comparative
genome hybridisation.”).
197. Archer v. Galbraith, 567 P.2d 1155, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a patient
has the right to be informed about an alternative “means of therapy pursued by a respectable segment
of the medical profession”).
198. Wachter v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1988), aff’d, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.
1989).
199. Id. at 1423–24.
200. Id. at 1423.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31, 176–181.

2014]

PERFECTING PREGNANCY

1325

medical prognosis.202 Moreover, the fact that optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening
is not yet a general practice in the ART field does not shield a physician from
liability for failing to inform patients of the experimental therapy. Because these
improved methodologies are accepted as treatment modalities that are supported
by some substantial percentage of reputable and respected experts in reproductive
medicine,203 these treatments fall within the definition of “medically acceptable”
alternatives. Thus, ART physicians still have the duty to inform their patients of
the existence of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening, notwithstanding its
experimental classification.
CONCLUSION
Modern medicine is largely a product of innovation grounded in empirical
science. But any time a physician adopts an emerging technology that can
transform the nature or delivery of clinical care, there is always the potential for a
new set of malpractice risks. This uncertainty can be so unsettling to physicians
that it may actually deter them from adopting new technologies that would best
serve the interests of their patients. The proposed standard of care in this Note
comports with the Learned Hand formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
which defines negligence as failing to take precautions whose costs do not exceed
the potential loss, multiplied by the probability of that loss.204 The reasonable
physician standard is the optimal framework for assessing the standard of care for
adopting emerging medical technologies because it is dynamic and easy to
administer, and is not over- or underinclusive. Many jurisdictions are already quite
familiar with judging physicians by standards of reasonable prudence,205 and
courts have had over half a century of experience applying the Hand formula.206
The reasonable physician standard also remedies problems of over- and
underinclusiveness that exist under a custom-based standard by liberating courts
from having to “hold every physician who deviates from custom liable and from
having to exonerate every physician who follows custom.”207 Most importantly,
the reasonable physician standard is dynamic because it allows the standard of care
to evolve in light of current medical advances by reducing the chilling effects that
a “custom-based standard places on physicians desiring to disregard customary
practice.”208
202. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
203. See studies cited supra notes 29–31, 176–181.
204. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). As applied
here, a standard of care is overinclusive where physicians are penalized for using their best judgment
and deviating from questionable customary norms in favor of emerging technologies that improve
patient welfare. Conversely, a standard of care is under-inclusive where physicians can escape liability
by asserting that they were merely adhering to customary, albeit harmful, medical practices.
205. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 187–88 (arguing that courts are shifting away from a custombased standard in favor of a reasonable physician standard).
206. Williams, supra note 38, at 521.
207. Id. at 520.
208. Id. at 521.
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Under the reasonable physician standard, courts would hold physicians
accountable for the failure to recommend, or provide patients with, optimized
PGS-aneuploidy screening, to the extent that not doing so violates Hand’s
formula, which is essentially the same standard employed in Helling v. Carey.
Imposing such a duty on physicians advances compelling policies, including
protecting the health and safety of vulnerable ART patients; encouraging physician
and patient autonomy in clinical decision making; promoting the reproductive
autonomy of individuals with recurring, but surmountable, fertility issues; and
facilitating the rapid development of state-of-the-art techniques and devices in
reproductive medicine.

